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NOTE
SALINAS V. TEXAS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT'S APPLICATION IN NON-CUSTODIAL
INTERROGATIONS
Amanda Hornickt
I. INTRODUCTION

The Fifth Amendment self-incrimination clause states that a person
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself This clause is
important in the field of criminal procedure because it determines whether
a criminal defendant's statements can be used against him. However, there
are some Fifth Amendment issues that have not been completely settled.
The issue of pre-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence is one such issue. The Supreme
Court has previously held that post-arrest, post-Mirandasilence cannot be
used against a person,' and post-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence cannot be used
as substantive evidence against a person.' Otherwise, the Court's holding in
Miranda v. Arizona4 would have no effect.' The Court touched on the issue
of pre-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence recently in the case of Salinas v. Texas,' a
murder case in which the prosecutor used the defendant's silence during
police questioning as evidence of his guilt.7 Nevertheless, because the Court
based its reasoning, in part, on other factors-namely, the defendant's other
behavior during police questioning-the question of pre-arrest, preMiranda silence should remain open. Since the Fifth Amendment states
that a person may not be compelled to be a witness against himself,' the
answer to this question turns on whether the person was compelled to
t

Submissions Editor, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW, Volume 9. J.D. Candidate

Liberty University School of Law (2015); Ed. D. Candidate, Liberty University School of
Education.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
2. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610,619 (1976).

3. See United States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1027-33 (9th Cir. 2001).
4. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
5. Id.; Doyle, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).
6. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).

7. Id. at 2177-78.
8. See id. at 2178.
9. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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answer questions posed by the police. Although pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
police questioning is supposedly less coercive than post-arrest, postMiranda questioning," there are circumstances in which pre-arrest, preMiranda questioning can be coercive. In these circumstances, the person's
silence during this questioning should not be brought in against that person
as substantive evidence in a criminal case, due to the fact that evidence of
this silence would violate both the Fifth Amendment and Federal Rule of
Evidence 403.1
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court and several circuit courts have held that there are
certain circumstances in which silence is a protected means of invoking the
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.2 These courts have
also held that silence is not a protected means of invoking the privilege in
other circumstances.' 3 These courts have decided several important
questions of Fifth Amendment jurisprudence. Nevertheless, several
questions in this field remain open.
A. Situations in Which Silence Does Not Invoke the PrivilegeAgainst SelfIncrimination
There are several situations in which silence is not a legitimate means of
invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. One of
the situations is when a person who is not in custody selectively answers
some questions and refuses to provide a legitimate reason for his failure to
answer other questions in a timely manner.
The Supreme Court has held that a person must give a reason for why
he does not answer police questioning. 4 This situation occurred in Roberts
v. United States." In that case, the defendant was voluntarily speaking to the
police. 6 The defendant was convicted, based in part on his refusal to answer
10. Compare Salinas v. Texas, 133 S Ct. 2174 (2013), with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966).
11. This evidentiary rule states that evidence may not be admitted if its prejudicial effect
outweighs its probative value. FED. R. EvID. 403.
12. See infra Part II.B.
13. See infra Part II.A.
14. Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 557 (1980).
15. Id. at 552.
16. Id. at 553.
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the officers' questions. 7 He argued that his failure to respond was justified
by his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination.18 However, the
Court held that "[t]he Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled selfincrimination is not self-executing. At least where the Government has no
substantial reason to believe that the requested disclosures are likely to be
incriminating, the privilege may not be relied upon unless it is invoked in a
timely fashion."19 Therefore, the Roberts Court held that the privilege must
be expressly invoked when the defendant is not in custody while the police
are questioning him.2" In this situation, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination is waived if not brought in a timely manner."'
The Court did not, however, specifically define what "timely manner"
meant-it simply held that the defendant waived his privilege because he
did not invoke it at any time during the three-year period between his
conversation with police and his conviction. 2 Justice Brennan's
concurrence noted that the government's questioning was not directed at
incriminating the defendant, and so the defendant's failure to state a neutral
inference that would explain his silence during questioning could be used
against him.23 Nevertheless, Justice Brennan also noted that "sentencing
judges should conduct an inquiry into the circumstances of silence where a
defendant indicates before sentencing that his refusal to cooperate is
prompted by constitutionally protected, or morally defensible, motives." 4
In other words, if a defendant indicates, after being questioned by police but
before being convicted, that his refusal to speak was brought about by his
constitutional right, the judge should inquire into the reasons why the
defendant refused to speak. This suggested safeguard would protect a
defendant's constitutional rights, yet still allow silence to be used against a
defendant in certain circumstances.
Although the Roberts Court held that a defendant's silence could be used
against him, the majority opinion provoked a strong dissent from Justice

17. Id. at 559.
18. Id. at 559.
19. Id.

20. Id. at 560 (stating that the Miranda warnings given to the defendant did not impact
the outcome because the exception for Mirandawarnings does not apply outside of custodial
settings).
21. Id. at 560.
22. Id. at 561.

23. Id. at 562 (Brennan, J., concurring).
24. Id. at 563.
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Marshall.2" Marshall mentioned that, in certain instances, police could give
defendants immunity from prosecution in order to get them to speak.26
Justice Marshall argued that the courts, by allowing a defendant to be
incriminated because of his silence, diminish the incentive for the police to
offer immunity to defendants.27 The police will not use immunity to elicit
answers from the defendant if they can simply incriminate the defendant
with his silence.2" In Roberts, the defendant selectively refused to answer
questions regarding other people who had engaged in criminal activity with
him.2 9 This factual pattern prompted Justice Marshall's statements that
silence should be protected;" however, the Supreme Court previously stated
that a person's refusal to answer questions about co-conspirators is not
constitutionally protected.3'
The Supreme Court previously held that silence does not invoke the
privilege where the privilege against self-incrimination is not, in fact, being
invoked for the protection of the person who is speaking but instead for the
protection of others. When disclosing information about another person is
unlikely to incriminate the person being questioned, the privilege may not
be invoked through silence.32 In Rogers v. United States,33 the Supreme

Court held that because a woman's statements about the criminal activity of
others was not likely to incriminate her,34 she could not refuse to speak, and
her refusal to speak was not privileged under the Fifth Amendment right
against self-incrimination.3"
B. Situations in Which Silence is Sufficient to Invoke the Privilege Against
Self-Incrimination
Although there are a few situations in which the Supreme Court has held
that silence is not a legitimate means of invoking the Fifth Amendment

25. See id. at 563-72.
26. Id. at 568 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 554 (majority opinion).
30. Id. at 563-72.
31. Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367, 370 (1951).
32. Id. at 373.
33. Id. at 367.
34. Id. at 375.
35. Id. at 370.
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privilege against self-incrimination,3 6 there are other situations in which
both the Supreme Court and several circuit courts have held that silence is
an effective means of invoking the privilege.3 1 Most of these situations
involve the pressures of a custodial interrogation. However, courts have
held that the threat of losing government benefits is sufficiently coercive,
and this threat removes the free will to answer or refuse to answer;
therefore, courts permit the option of silence as a means of invoking the
3
privilege against self-incrimination. 1
Several cases have held that the threatened loss of a government job will
allow the defendant to invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
through silence.39 For example, when a policeman failed to talk at will, but
later gave a forced confession after being threatened with removal from
office, the Supreme Court held that the threat of removal from office
constituted impermissible coercion, which rendered the confession
involuntary.4" The policeman's silence would have sufficed to invoke the
privilege in this context.41
In Garrity v. New Jersey," several policemen were questioned about the
way they handled cases.43 One of the policemen had been told that he could
refuse to answer; nonetheless, he was also told that if he refused to answer,
he would be fired." The Court stated that the choice between talking and
being fired for refusing to talk was of a coercive nature.45 In holding that the
policeman could not be forced to choose between losing his job or
testifying, the Court stated that "[t]he privilege against self-incrimination
would be reduced to a hollow mockery if its exercise could be taken as
equivalent either to a confession of guilt or a conclusive presumption of
perjury. . . .The privilege serves to protect the innocent who otherwise

36. See supra Part II.A.
37. See United States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1027-33 (9th Cir. 2001); United
States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 1976).
38. See Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977); Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70
(1973).
39. See Cunningham,431 U.S. 801; Turley, 414 U.S. 70.
40. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500 (1967).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 493.
43. Id. at 494.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 499-500.
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might be ensnared by ambiguous circumstances." 46 The Court stated that
the threat of removal from office deprived the defendant of his right to
choose to speak or remain silent.4 ' The Court found that silence was
protected in this situation even though the coercive nature of the
questioning was reduced by the fact that three of the four defendants had
attorneys present at the time of the questioning. 4 Justice Harlan dissented
on the ground that the defense had not even argued that the defendants'
confessions resulted from "physical or mental coercion."" He stated that
the tactics had not overcome the will of the police officers; therefore, the
police officers' free choice to make the statements or remain silent was not
eliminated by coercion.5"
Justice Harlan also dissented in Spevack v. Klein,51 a Fifth Amendment
case decided in the same year as Garrity v. New Jersey.2 In Spevack, the
defendant was a lawyer who was disbarred for refusing to submit certain
documents under a subpoena duces tecum.5 3 The lawyer stated that his
refusal to submit the documents was the result of his belief that the
documents would incriminate him.' He argued that, because of his Fifth
Amendment right against coerced self-incrimination, he did not have to
submit the documents and his disbarment was an unconstitutional
punishment for his assertion of his Fifth Amendment right.5 5 Although
Justice White noted that the state had a legitimate interest in disbarring or
firing state employees who are dishonest or who are involved in criminal
activity, 6 the Court said this type of coercion tactic cannot be used. 7
Although Justice Harlan again stated that the defendant was not penalized

46. Id. (quoting Slochower v. Bd. of Educ., 350 U.S. 551, 557-58 (1956)).
47. Id. at 494.
48. Id. at 506 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
49. Id. at 503.
50. Id.
51. Spevackv. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967).
52. Garrityv. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967).
53. Spevack, 385 U.S. at 512.
54. Id. at 512-13.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 532 (White, J., dissenting). Note that Justice White's dissent, which is found at
the end of Spevack v. Klein, covers both Spevack and Garrity.Justice White thought that the
state had a legitimate interest in firing the police officers in Garrity for the same reason that
the state had a legitimate interest in disbarring the defendant in Spevack. Id.
57. Id.
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for invoking the privilege,58 the majority recognized that the threat of
disbarment was sufficiently coercive, and the defendant could have invoked
the privilege through silence.59 The majority also stated that the Fifth
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,
forbids the prosecution from commenting on a defendant's silence' 0 and
that the Fifth Amendment also prohibits a court from instructing the jury
that a defendant's silence is evidence of guilt.6
In Leflowitz v. Cunningham,62 the Court reaffirmed its position that the
threat of losing a government job allows the defendant to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination through silence.6 3 In
Cunningham, a public official refused to testify about his conduct in regards
to the position that he held.6' Since he refused to testify, he was removed
from office and banned from holding any public or party office for the next
five years.65 The Court held that "when a State compels testimony by
threatening to inflict potent sanctions unless the constitutional privilege is
surrendered, that testimony is obtained in violation of the Fifth
Amendment and cannot be used against the declarant in a subsequent
criminal prosecution."' The Court's statement reaffirmed the rulings in
Garrity and Spevack and noted that the threatened loss of employment rose
to such a coercive nature that the defendant could not be expected to
choose between giving possibly self-incriminating statements and losing his
job.

67

In addition to the Supreme Court's holding that the threatened loss of a
job is sufficiently coercive to enable the defendant to invoke the privilege
through silence,68 several circuit courts have held that the privilege may be

58. Id. at 529 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
59. Id. at 516 (majority opinion).
60. Id. at 515 (quoting Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965)).
61. Id.
62. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
63. Id.
64. Id. at 803.
65. Id. at 803-04.
66. Id. at 805.
67. Id.
68. Silence can mean either refusing to answer questions asked by police or refusing to
expressly invoke the privilege on the witness stand. See id.
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invoked through silence in various other circumstances. 9 One circuit has
held that the privilege against self-incrimination is not "all or nothing."" It
may be invoked by selectively answering questions posed by the police.7' In
fact, the court specifically stated, "[a] suspect may remain selectively silent
by answering some questions and then refusing to answer others without
taking the risk that his silence may be used against him at trial."72 The court
also found that "when a defendant remains silent or refuses to answer a
question posed by police, that silence or refusal is inadmissible."" This
statement shows that the defendant's silence during police questioning
cannot be held against the defendant; the Fifth Amendment protects the
defendant from the prosecutor's use of his silence as evidence. A
defendant's silence may not be brought into court even if the police tell the
defendant that his silence may be held against him-his Fifth Amendment
rights do not simply cease because of an officer's warnings.74 The court
stated that the silence was protected because post-Miranda silence is
ambiguous; the court cannot tell whether the defendant's silence is an
indication of guilt or a natural response to the Mirandawarnings.7" When a
prosecutor references the defendant's post-arrest silence during the trial,
the error is not harmless, and the judgment of the trial court must be
reversed,76 especially when the other evidence of guilt is not
overwhelming.77
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has also held that the privilege may
be selectively invoked.7" The Tenth Circuit held that the partial invocation
of the right by selectively answering questions is protected.79 Nevertheless,
the court asserted that the prosecutor's comments on the defendant's
silence did not constitute reversible error because the prosecutor's
statements were made solely for the purpose of impeaching the defendant's
69. Hurd v. Terhune, 619 F.3d 1080 (9th Cir. 2010); United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885
(10th Cir. 1995).
70. Hurd, 619 F.3d at 1087.
71. Id.

72. Id.
73. Id. at 1088.
74. Id. at 1089.

75. Id.
76. Id. at 1090.
77. Id. at 1091.
78. United States v. May, 52 F.3d 885, 889 (10th Cir. 1995).

79. Id.
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testimony by calling attention to the defendant's prior inconsistent
statements."0 Furthermore, the statements did not result in reversible error
because a reasonable jury would not have taken the statements as a
comment on the defendant's silence."' This case shows the differentiation
between the use of the defendant's pre-trial silence as substantive evidence
and the use of the defendant's pre-trial silence to impeach him. s 2 Several

other courts also have held that a defendant's silence may be used against
him as impeachment even when it may not be used as substantive
evidence. 3
The Supreme Court and several circuit courts have been consistent in
holding that a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence may not be
used against him at trial. In Miranda v. Arizona, 4 the Supreme Court held
that a defendant could not be taken into custody and questioned by the
police without first being read certain warnings.8 5 These warnings tell the
defendant that she has certain rights that she can choose to exercise or
waive during police questioning. 6 The defendant must be told that she has
the right to remain silent, that anything she says can and will be used
against her, that she has the right to an attorney, and that an attorney will be
provided for her if she cannot afford one. 7 The Miranda Court also held
that the prosecution has the burden of showing that the warnings were
given to the defendant and were freely waived by the defendant.8 These
warnings are needed because they serve as protective devices to ensure that
there is no coercion in the interrogation. 9 In fact, they help overcome the
pressures of physical and mental coercion that occur with custodial
interrogation. The Court in Miranda held, in order to be protected by the
80. Id. at 890.

81. Id.
82. See GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 447-48 (6th ed. 2013) (stating the differences
between the use of silence to impeach and the use of silence as substantive evidence, and
noting that the use of silence for impeachment does not need to meet the high standard for
admission that must be met when silence is brought in as substantive evidence).
83. See, e.g., Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S.
231, 240 (1980).
84. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
85. Id. at 444.
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 479.
89. Id. at 458.
90. Id. at 447-48, 469.
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Fifth Amendment and to be able to take full advantage of the privilege
against self-incrimination, a defendant must be informed of the privilege."
The Supreme Court's decision in Miranda was reasserted by the Supreme
Court in Doyle v. Ohio,92 which held that a defendant's silence may not be
used against him, even for impeachment purposes, after he had been given
Mirandawarnings.93
Limited in scope, Miranda only applies in situations where the defendant
has been taken into custody and is interrogated by police.94 For a person to
be in custody, the person must have been arrested or "otherwise deprived
of... freedom of action in any significant way."95 Miranda held that there
was a right to choose between silence and speech, 96 and such rights could
not be waived by mere silence. 97 Additionally, the Miranda Court found
that these rights are not waived if the defendant has answered some
questions before asserting the right to remain silent.9 The Miranda Court
reversed several defendants' convictions because they had not adequately
been informed of their rights before they were interrogated. 99 Those
defendants' confessions were obtained from these invalid interrogations,
and therefore, the court reversed their convictions."
Several circuit courts have manifested their adoption of this binding
principle. In United States v. Canterbury,'' the Tenth Circuit held that the
defendant's due process rights were violated when the prosecutor
commented on the defendant's post-arrest silence. 1°2 The Court stated,
"partial silence does not preclude [the defendant] from claiming a violation
of his due process rights."0 3 The court even stated that the use of the

91. Id. at 467.
92. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).

93. Id. at 619.
94. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 444.

95. Id.
96. Id. at 469.

97. Id. at 475.
98. Id. at 475-76.
99. Id. at 492, 494, 496. Note that Miranda involved four cases that were consolidated
when they came before the Supreme Court.
100. Id.
101.

United States v. Canterbury, 985 F.2d 483 (10th Cir. 1993).

102. Id. at 484.
103. Id. at 486.
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defendant's silence to impeach was not proper under these circumstances."'
Due to the fact that the defendant had been arrested and had been given his
Miranda warnings, the prosecutor's use of defendant's silence to impeach
the defendant was unwarranted and violated the defendant's due process
rights. ' The court held that post-arrest, post-Mirandasilence could not be
used to impeach the defendant even though it admitted that the use of
silence for impeachment was different from the use of silence as substantive
evidence." 6 It based its decision on the fact that the defendant had not made
statements after being arrested that were inconsistent with his statements at
trial; therefore, the prosecutor's cross-examination of the defendant could
not be used to impeach the defendant, and the use of the defendant's silence
during the prosecutor's cross-examination was sufficient to merit a
reversal."0 By discrediting the defendant's testimony through the use of his
silence to "impeach" the testimony, the prosecutor violated the defendant's
due process rights."'
The Fourth Circuit has also acknowledged that a defendant, in relying on
his understanding of his Miranda warnings, may use silence as a means of
invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination." 9 The
court held that "if, in declining to answer certain questions, a criminal
accused invokes his fifth amendment [sic] privilege or in any other manner
indicates he is relying on his understanding of the Miranda warning,
evidence of his silence or of his refusal to answer specific questions is
inadmissible."1 This case further supports the well-accepted legal theory
that a person's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence may not be used against
him.
Courts also have held that a guilty plea does not waive the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in further criminal
proceedings.1 ' The Supreme Court stated that a defendant retained her
Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination at her sentencing
hearing even though she had pled guilty to the crime."' When the
104. Id.
105. Id. (citing United States v. Massey, 687 F.2d 1348, 1353 (10th Cir. 1982)).
106. Id.
107. Id. at 487.

108. Id. at 486.
109. United States v. Ghiz, 491 F.2d 599, 600 (4th Cir. 1974).
110. Id.
111.

See Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314 (1999).

112. Id. at 316.
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defendant refused to speak at her sentencing hearing she was given a
sentence that was based partially on her refusal to speak. The Supreme
Court reversed her sentence and stated that the sentencing court may not
draw adverse inferences from the defendant's silence. 1 3 Although the
Supreme Court had previously held that a defendant may not be selectively
silent in a single proceeding such as a trial-that is, the defendant cannot
selectively testify'1 4 -a person may choose to invoke the privilege in a later
proceeding, even when she has failed to invoke it at an earlier phase."' The
Court noted that the danger of the court being misled by selective
disclosure"' was very low under these circumstances and held that the
defendant was being forced either to testify or to receive a harsher
punishment." 7 The Court held that using this forced testimony to enhance
prosecutorial power was a violation of the defendant's Fifth Amendment
rights."'
III. SALINAS V. TEXAS:
SILENCE AS AN IMPERMISSIBLE MEANS OF INVOKING THE PRIVILEGE
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION IN A NON-CUSTODIAL SITUATION

A. Facts
On December 18, 1992, two brothers were shot and killed in their
home."' Although no one witnessed the shooting, the brothers' neighbor
noticed someone fleeing the scene of the crime. 2 The neighbor saw the
suspect leave the scene in a dark-colored vehicle. 2' The police recovered
shotgun shell casings at the scene of the crime. 2 2 The evidence that the

113. Id. at 317.
114. Id. at 321 (citing Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 154-55 (1958)).
115. Seeid. at316.
116. The danger of misleading the court through selective disclosure is a factor that the
Court considers in analyzing whether the selective use of silence may be employed by the
defendant. See Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 323.
117. Mitchell, 526 U.S. at 323, 325.
118. Id.
119. Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.

2014]

SALINAS V. TEXAS

police found led them to the defendant, Genovevo Salinas. 23 Salinas had a
dark-colored vehicle parked in his driveway, and he was in possession of a
shotgun, which he handed over to police for ballistics testing. 24 Salinas
voluntarily went to the police station to be questioned. 5 Apparently, the
police had told Salinas that they wanted to take him to the station so that
26
they could "take photographs and to clear him as [a] suspect."'
When Salinas arrived at the police station, he was questioned in a noncustodial manner for about an hour.'27 When Salinas was being questioned,
he answered most of the police officers' questions. 2 " However, when police
asked him whether ballistics would show that his shotgun matched the shell
casings found at the crime scene, Salinas refused to answer. 29 Instead of
speaking, Salinas "[1]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his
bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up." 30
After a "few moments" of silence, the police resumed questioning.' Salinas
answered the subsequent questions posed by the police.'32
At some point after this interview, the police determined that there was
not enough evidence to charge Salinas, so they released him.'33 A short time
later, a man stated that he had heard Salinas confess to the killings.' Using
35
this additional evidence, police were able to obtain an arrest warrant.1
However, Salinas had fled during the time in which he was released, and the
police did not find him until 2007.136
Salinas did not testify during his trial.'37 The prosecutors used Salinas's
reaction to the question about the shotgun as evidence that he was guilty. 3 '
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citation omitted).
Id. at 2178 (plurality opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The jury found Salinas guilty of murder, and Salinas was sentenced to
twenty years in prison. 3 9 Salinas appealed to the Court of Appeals of
Texas. 40 During this appeal, he argued that the prosecutors' use of his
silence against him was a violation of the Fifth Amendment.' The Court of
Appeals rejected this argument, stating that Salinas's silence was not
compelled because he had not yet been arrested or given Miranda
warnings.' After the Court of Appeals rendered its decision, the Texas
Court of Criminal Appeals heard the case and affirmed the decision of the
43
Court of Appeals of Texas. 1
B. Salinas v. Texas at the Supreme Court: Holdingand Rationale
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari and affirmed
the decision of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, thereby upholding
Salinas's conviction.'" In deciding Salinas's case, the Supreme Court held
that a defendant's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda*silence could be used against
him at trial. 45 The Court stated that when a defendant is silent during
questioning, and the questioning occurs before the defendant is arrested
and given his Miranda warnings, the police have not coerced the defendant
into silence.'" Since the Fifth Amendment does not give a general right to
silence, a defendant who has not been coerced by police into remaining
silent cannot use the Fifth Amendment privilege unless he has expressly
47
invoked it.
The majority reasoned that the requirement that the privilege be
expressly invoked exists because it puts the government "on notice when a
witness intends to rely on the privilege so that it may either argue that the
testimony sought could not be self-incriminating ...or cure any potential
self-incrimination through a grant of immunity." 41 It also helps courts
understand the specific reasons why the witness refuses to answer the
139.
140.
141.
142.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

143. Id. at 2179.
144. Id. at 2178.
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 2179 (citing Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486 (1951); Kastigar v.
United States, 406 U.S. 441, 448 (1972)).
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question. 4 9 In other words, the government needs to know if the privilege is
being invoked, and why it is being invoked, so that it can take measures to
continue its prosecution. The Court stated that, although there are
exceptions to this rule, Salinas's case did not fall within one of those
exceptions because he had voluntarily come down to the police station and
started answering the officers' questions.5 Because Salinas was not
deprived of the ability to voluntarily invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege,
and because he failed to invoke this privilege, Salinas's silence could not be
protected under the Fifth Amendment. 5' The Court stated that making a
general exception to the Fifth Amendment privilege where the privilege was
invoked through silence would "needlessly burden the Government's
interests in obtaining testimony and prosecuting criminal activity."' 52 The
Court also stated that the privilege must be expressly invoked even when
the officer has reason to believe that the answer to the question will
incriminate the witness.' 53 Salinas argued that when the question is one that
the interrogating officer knows or expects will incriminate the witness, and
the witness remains silent, the privilege should be invoked.'54 The Court,
however, held that because the privilege is not considered to be invoked in
either of these situations, it could not be met at the "intersection" of these
two situations.' The Court also stated that a witness's constitutional right
to remain silent in the face of questioning depends on his reasons for
remaining silent, and that those reasons must be available for the court to
evaluate in determining whether the Fifth Amendment privilege was rightly
asserted.'56
The Court also found Salinas's behavior during the time of the
questioning to be a factor in determining whether his Fifth Amendment
privilege was invoked.' The Court noted that when Salinas was asked the
question about whether the shell casings found at the scene of the crime
would match his shotgun, he not only remained silent but he also made
certain movements that would tend to indicate his discomfort at the
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
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Id. at2180.
Id.
Id. at2181.
Id.
Id. at 2181-82.
Id.
Id. at 2183.
Id.
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question. 5 ' These behaviors led to an inference of guilt because they show
that Salinas was uncomfortable with answering the question that was
presented to him. This portion of the analysis could have been dispositive,
but the Court only mentioned the defendant's other behaviors in one
paragraph of its opinion-it did not consider these factors to be extremely
important to the disposition of the case." 9 The Court's main holding
involved the fact that Salinas had not been under pressure by the police-he
retained his ability to voluntarily invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege. 6
Since he did not properly invoke this privilege, however, his Fifth
Amendment privilege could not be protected. 6 '
C. Justice Thomas' ConcurringOpinion
Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment, stating that the Court's prior
holding in Griffin v. California,'62 which held that a defendant was not
required to expressly invoke the privilege when on the stand at his trial, was
incorrect. 63 Justice Thomas focused his concurrence on the principle that a
defendant should not be given his Fifth Amendment privilege without
expressly invoking it, even when the defendant is on the witness stand at
trial.'" Justice Thomas reasoned that because the privilege should not be
protected without being expressly invoked, and because Salinas did not
expressly invoke the privilege, Salinas cannot be protected by the
65
privilege.
D. JusticeBreyer's DissentingOpinion
Justice Breyer stated that the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination prohibits a prosecutor from commenting on a defendant's
silence in the face of police interrogation.' He stated that giving a
defendant a choice between talking and remaining silent was impermissible
because the prosecutor could then bring in information about how the
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 2184.
Id.
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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Id.
Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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silence shows consciousness of guilt.'67 The defendant may then feel
compulsion to speak at trial, and when he tries to explain his speech or
silence at trial, the prosecutor could use prior convictions to impeach his
testimony. 6 This situation would put the defendant in a tough
predicament and would render his Fifth Amendment privilege void.'69
During this portion of his analysis, Justice Breyer failed to mention that the
defendant would also have the option to expressly invoke his Fifth
Amendment privilege. 7 ° It is possible that Justice Breyer believed that
expressly invoking the privilege would serve as a means of selfincrimination, but he did not specifically state this line of reasoning.
Justice Breyer used the next part of his dissenting opinion to explain how
many of the cases used in the plurality opinion do not support the
proposition that silence is not protected by the Fifth Amendment. 7 ' He
stated that the cases cited by the majority show that only self-incrimination,
not fear of incriminating others, is protected; that silence that does not have
enough of a connection to the Fifth Amendment privilege cannot be used to
invoke the privilege; and that silence not based on Fifth Amendment
grounds is not protected.'72
Justice Breyer split the Fifth Amendment cases into two types: (1) those
in which express invocation is not required to tie the defendant's silence to
the Fifth Amendment privilege, and (2) those in which invocation is needed
to tie the defendant's silence to the Fifth Amendment privilege.'73 The
dissent also discussed a third type of case: those in which the defendant is
not required to respond to police questioning or expressly invoke the
privilege when expressly invoking the privilege would be punished by the
loss of a government job or government benefits.'74
The dissent also mentioned three important circumstances that
determine which situations require the Fifth Amendment privilege to be
invoked. 7 The first circumstance is "whether one can fairly infer that the
individual being questioned is invoking the [Fifth] Amendment's
167.
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170.
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173.
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protection."'76 If the police officer believes that the person he is questioning
will need to give up incriminating information by answering a question,
then the Fifth Amendment privilege does not need to be invoked because
the officer can reasonably understand that the person he is questioning is
asserting the privilege through his silence. 177 The second circumstance is
that, when the facts of the first circumstance are unclear, that is, if the
interrogating officer cannot infer that the person he is questioning is trying
to assert his Fifth Amendment privilege through his silence, it must be
determined whether it is important for the interrogating officer to know if
the individual is asserting the privilege. 17 If it is not important for the
interrogating officer to know that the individual is invoking his Fifth
Amendment privilege, then the privilege does not need to be expressly
invoked.1 79 Finally, if the officer does not know that the individual is
asserting his Fifth Amendment privilege through silence, and if it is
important for the officer to know that the individual is asserting his Fifth
Amendment privilege, the defendant does not need to answer if "there is a
good reason for excusing the individual from referring to the Fifth
Amendment, such as inherent penalization simply by answering."180 These
circumstances show the critical question in Fifth Amendment cases:
whether the circumstances of the case "give rise to a fair inference that the
8
silence rests on the Fifth Amendment."' '

According to the dissent, Salinas should not have needed to answer
because his case fits within the first circumstance. By asking the question
about the shotgun, the police were attempting to solicit an incriminating
answer from Salinas, and they expected him to give an incriminating
answer.'82 Because the circumstances of Salinas's case put the police on
notice that Salinas was attempting to invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege
through his silence, Salinas's conviction should have been reversed."8 3

176. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id. at 2190.
181. Id. The Court says that it is "[f]ar better ... to pose the relevant question directly:
Can one fairly infer from an individual's silence and surrounding circumstances an exercise
of the Fifth Amendment's privilege?" Id. at 2191.
182. Id. at 2189.
183. Id. at 2190.
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IV. ANALYSIS

A. Introduction
The Fifth Amendment states that "No person... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.. .""1 The language of the
Fifth Amendment does not specifically state that silence is protected;
however, it does state that a person cannot be compelled to be a witness
against himself or herself."' The Fifth Amendment leaves open the question
of what can be defined as compulsion, which is important because the
existence of compulsion would necessarily lead to the conclusion that the
declarant's testimony against himself was compelled. Since a person cannot
be compelled to be a witness against himself, the disposition of Fifth
Amendment cases should turn on whether or not compulsion exists. The
word "compulsion" has been partially defined by several cases, such as
Lefkowitz v. Cunningham,"' which held that the threat of losing
employment constituted sufficient compulsion to invoke the Fifth
Amendment privilege.'87 When compulsion exists, the court has generally
held that the Fifth Amendment privilege may be invoked through silence.'88
The holding of Salinas v. Texas is not problematic. In this case, Salinas's
conviction was upheld;'89 accordingly, the facts in this case are sufficient to
support a conviction. 90 Salinas voluntarily went to the police station and
voluntarily answered most of the questions that the police had for him.'9 '
Yet when the police asked him whether his shotgun would match the
casings taken from the scene of the crime, he stopped talking, looked down,
and engaged in other nervous behaviors such as shuffling his feet, biting his
lip, and tightening up.'92 These behaviors went beyond mere silence and
could reasonably give the police the indication that Salinas was hiding
something.

184. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
185. Id.

186. Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977).
187. Id. at 805.
188. Id.
189. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178, 2184.
190. See id. at 2178 (noting that Salinas engaged in several incriminatory behaviors after
being asked whether his shotgun would match the shells found at the scene of the crime).
191. Id. at 2178.
192. Id.
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It is also important to note that Salinas not only answered all of the
questions before being asked the question about his shotgun; he also
answered all questions that were asked after the question about the
shotgun. 93 Salinas's behavior would tend to show that he was simply
avoiding one question. The most reasonable explanation of why he did not
answer is that he was hiding something, possibly the fact that he was unsure
whether his shotgun would match the shell casings. While it is true that
Salinas was not immediately arrested for the crime, 4 and that there was
initially not enough evidence to arrest Salinas for the crime,' 9 these facts do
not change the fact that Salinas was faced with a situation where he could
have asserted his Fifth Amendment privilege or said something exculpatory.
Instead, he engaged in behaviors that would tend to show that he was
uncomfortable with the question.'96 The extreme discomfort that Salinas
displayed leads to the conclusion that Salinas was hiding something. Due to
the unique circumstances of this case, the affirmation of Salinas's conviction
is fair.
Some of the rationale set forth in Salinas can, however, be problematic in
that it alludes that silence cannot be protected at all.'97 The Court cites one
case, Berghuis v. Thompkins,'98 to support its proposition that silence is not
a protected means of invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege against selfincrimination.' 99 Yet that case upheld the conviction of a defendant based
on his incriminating statements that he gave after nearly three hours of
silence."' The Court stated that this case stands for the proposition that
silence is not an effective means of invoking the privilege;20 ' however, there
is a difference between holding that silence does not invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination such that police must cease questioning a witness,
and holding that silence on a particular question is not an appropriate
means of invoking the privilege for that question. In the first situation, the

193.
194.
195.
196.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

197. See id. at 2179 (stating that the insistence on witnesses' express invocation of the
"privilege assures that the Government obtains all of the information to which it is
entitled.").
198. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).

199. Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2182.
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police are not using the defendant's silence against him, but in the second
situation, the silence is considered to be a means of inferring guilt. Guilt
should not be inferred from silence unless the silence is accompanied by
several other behaviors that, taken as a whole, are enough to constitute
guilt. Since Berghuis held that statements made after three hours of silence
were not protected under the Fifth Amendment,2"2 Berghuis does not truly
stand for the proposition that silence cannot be protected. Rather, it stands
for the proposition that silence does not protect subsequent
communications.2"3 Therefore, Berghuis is not dispositive of the question of
whether silence is an adequate means of invoking the privilege.
The Court could have used a totality of the circumstances test to uphold
Salinas's conviction; however, it chose to focus almost exclusively on
Salinas's silence.2 °4 Here, it was not Salinas's silence per se that should have
been used as evidence against him, but rather his body language that he
engaged in after the question was asked, coupled with his silence after being
asked that question. By focusing on silence in this case, the Court has not
adequately protected future defendants' Fifth Amendment rights. The
totality of the circumstances is an appropriate means of determining
whether a defendant's Fifth Amendment right is invoked. For example, a
rule could state that overt behaviors may be used as a means of inferring
criminality; however, silence alone may not. Overt body language, from
which a court may infer guilt, includes: looking down, fidgeting, shuffling
feet, biting one's lip, and tightening up. Guilt may also be inferred from
galvanic skin response,2"' otherwise known as skin conductance. 20 6 These
can be determined by checking to see if the person has sweaty palms,0 7 or
other physical responses that show nervousness, such as biting one's lip and
looking down at one's feet. Any one of these behaviors by itself should not
be viewed as dispositive. Also, when looking at these behaviors, it is
important to determine whether the behaviors existed since the beginning
of the conversation or were simply engaged in after a certain question was
202. Berghuis, 560 U.S. at 375-76 (stating that the defendant spoke after he was told he
could waive his right to remain silent).
203. Id.
204. See generally Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177-84.

205. Frank Horvath, An Experimental Comparison of the Psychological Stress Evaluator
and the Galvanic Skin Response in Detection of Deception, 63.3 J.APPLIED PSYCHOL. 338, 34041(1978).
206. Galvactivator:FrequentlyAsked Questions,
www.media.mit.edu/galvactivator/faq.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2014).

207. Id.
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asked. If the suspect has acted in this manner since the beginning of the
conversation, even if he voluntarily came to the police station to answer
questions, the court should not use the witness's behaviors against him.
However, if the witness only started engaging in the behaviors after being
asked a specific question, but did not engage in those behaviors throughout
the entire conversation, guilt may be inferred from the behaviors, and the
behaviors may be used against the witness in a criminal proceeding. The
court should always err on the side of caution in determining guilt, and any
uncertainties should be resolved in favor of the person being questioned if
there is no overwhelming evidence of the silent person's guilt. Treating
silence and body language in this manner ensures that people who are
innocent will be protected and that the government may still look for guilt
in behaviors that occur during an interrogation.
B. The Blanket Rationale Set Forth in Salinas is too Broad and Should Not
be Used
A blanket rule stating that a person's pre-arrest, pre-Mirandasilence may
be used against the silent person in a criminal proceeding should not be
used because this policy would not necessarily make convicting a guilty
person easier, but may lead to the convictions of innocent persons.
1. The Policy of Using a Person's Pre-Arrest, Pre-MirandaSilence
Against Him Will Not Make Convicting a Guilty Person Easier
The rule that a person's pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used
against him or her is intended to favor the government; however, this rule
does not make a large impact in favor of the government. In Salinas, the
defendant's behaviors, in addition to his silence, helped give him away.2"'
The defendant had "[1]ooked down at the floor, shuffled his feet, bit his
bottom lip, cl[e]nched his hands in his lap, [and] began to tighten up."209 He
also had answered all of the questions before the question on which he
remained silent and looked to the floor, and he answered all of the
questions after the question on which he had engaged in these
incriminating behaviors.2" ' Silence alone was not needed to infer that the
defendant was guilty because guilt could be inferred from other

208. See Salinas, 133 S.Ct. at 2178.
209. Id.
210. Id.
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behaviors."' In fact, many of these behaviors could be held as
communicative of guilt.212 Therefore, this case is similar to others in which
people gave incriminating answers after being silent for part of the
questioning 213 because here the behaviors themselves are communicative.
The use of these behaviors, together with the defendant's silence, was
sufficient to find an inference of guilt; nonetheless, because any one of these
behaviors by itself, especially the silence by itself, can be misleading, the
existence of only one of these behaviors should not be used as substantive
evidence against the defendant at trial. There should be more than one
behavior if the defendant's non-verbal acts are to be used as substantive
evidence against him at trial, and a totality of the circumstances test should
be used.
Totality of the circumstances tests were used prior to Miranda v.
Arizona214 and Escobedo v. Illinois21s as a means of determining if a person
was coerced into making a confession.2 6 Although this test is no longer
used in that manner, the totality of the circumstances test should be used
when determining whether a person's conduct during police questioning is
sufficient to find that the person had a guilty conscience during the
interrogation. In other words, when determining whether conduct during
the interrogation may be used as substantive evidence of guilt, the number
and type of behaviors engaged in during the interrogation should be
examined and weighed. If the totality of the circumstances shows that the
defendant was engaging in behaviors because of a guilty conscience, then
the evidence should be admitted against him at trial. However, if the totality
of the circumstances does not show that the defendant was engaging in
behaviors because of a guilty conscience, then the evidence should not be
admitted at trial because it will have a low probative value and will not be
useful to the government in ensuring that guilty individuals are
imprisoned.217

211. See id.
212. See discussion supra Part III.A.
213. See, e.g., Berghuis v. Thompkins, 560 U.S. 370 (2010).
214. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
215. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
216. See Miranda,384 U.S. at 503 (Clark, J., dissenting); Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503, 514 (1963).
217. See FED. R. EVID. 401 and FED. R. EVID. 403.
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. Also, in Salinas, because the defendant engaged in other behaviors that
tend to show guilt,21 there was no need for the Court to make a blanket rule
that silence may be used as substantive evidence in every situation in which
the defendant had engaged in silence during pre-arrest, pre-Miranda
questioning. Since silence alone was not needed to show that the defendant
in Salinas showed a guilty conscience, 1 9 there was no need to use this case
to show that silence alone should be used as substantive evidence. The
Court should have deferred this question until a case with silence as the
only showing of guilt during the interrogation arose.
2. The Policy of Using a Person's Pre-Arrest, Pre-MirandaSilence
Against Him May Lead to Convictions of Innocent Persons
Silence alone should not serve as substantive evidence of guilt due to the
fact that it tends to mislead the jury. People engage in silence during
interrogations for multiple reasons, and although guilt may not be the
reason for the silence, when a prosecutor presents the silence as substantive
evidence of guilt, the jury may believe that the silence could only have been
the result of a guilty mind. Yet silence may appear to be the only choice to a
person who is being questioned by police. During the 1950s, Senator
McCarthy questioned several people who were thought to be
communists.22 ° He told these people "an innocent man does not need the
Fifth Amendment." 2 1 If a person believes that the police will infer her guilt
from her invocation of the privilege, then she may refuse to expressly
invoke the privilege for fear that the invocation of the privilege will be used
against her for the remainder of the police's dealings with her. In this
situation, the person has simply used silence because she feels that expressly
invoking the privilege will harm her or that the willingness to speak would
lead her to say something that is not true.2 22 Therefore, forcing a person to

218. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2178 (2013).
219. See id. (noting the behaviors in which the defendant was engaged when he was asked
whether the shotgun shells found at the scene would match his shotgun).
220. Donald A. Ritchie, Joseph McCarthy and the Fifth Amendment Communists, in THE
RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION 83 (Kimberly Troisi-Paton ed., Thomson-Gale 2006).
221. Id. at 92-93.
222. See, e.g., Frances E. Chapman, Coerced Internalized False Confessions and Police
Interrogations: The Power of Coercion, 37 L. & PSYCHOL. REv. 159 (2013) (recognizing the
existence of coerced internalized false confessions and explaining that there are ways to
mitigate this problem); Richard A. Leo & Deborah Davis, From False Confession to Wrongful
Conviction:Seven PsychologicalProcesses, 38(1/2) j. PSYCHIATRY & L.9 (2010).
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expressly invoke the privilege may be something that an innocent person is
afraid to do.
The innocent person should not be punished for failing to expressly
invoke the privilege when she reasonably fears that the invocation of the
privilege would tend to make police and prosecutors believe that she is
guilty and portray her as such. Although there are some protections against
this problem, such as the rule that a person need not expressly invoke the
privilege when the invocation of the privilege would tend to incriminate the
person,223 these rules do not serve as a sufficient protection for an innocent
person who is being questioned by police. Generally, when the police are
questioning a person, the police will believe the person is guilty if she asserts
her Fifth Amendment privilege. Like Senator McCarthy, the police may
assume that the person who asserts the privilege has something to hide. The
rule that a person need not expressly invoke the privilege against selfincrimination, when the invocation of the privilege would itself tend to
incriminate, is not applied in all situations in which the police question a
person.224 Also of importance is the fact that physical evidence on the
person is not covered by the Fifth Amendment's protections;225 so a person
may not want to explicitly invoke the Fifth Amendment for fear of having
physical evidence taken from her person. Therefore, it does not protect
people in many situations.
There are many situations in which the express invocation of the
privilege against self-incrimination would itself tend to incriminate. A
person is not, however, protected from having the invocation used against
her in some of these circumstances. First of all, several courts have held that
a person may not assert the privilege if he or she does not reasonably believe
that the answer to the question will tend to incriminate him or her.226 Some
courts have even stated that a person must offer an explanation of why her
answers to questions would tend to be incriminating.227 In other words, the
assertion of the privilege will necessarily give the indication that the person
who claims the privilege is guilty of something. When a person states that

223. See Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511, 513-14 (1967).
224. For example, if the defendant in Salinas had tried to invoke the Fifth Amendment
privilege on the question about the shotgun shells, the invocation of the privilege would tend
to show that he was guilty, or that there was some reason that he did not want to answer the
question.
225. See Nita A. Farahany, IncriminatingThoughts, 64.2 STAN. L. REv. 351 (2012).
226. Davis v. Fendler, 650 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1984).
227. Id. at 1160.
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she will not answer on the grounds that her answer may incriminate her,
the police could infer guilt from this statement.
It would also be difficult for a person who is not guilty of any crime, but
who is afraid to talk to the police, to claim the privilege. Additionally, if
there is an innocent person-who is not charged with a crime and therefore
has no reason to believe her words will be used against her-she may
reasonably believe that she is unable to invoke the privilege. After all, the
privilege is only supposed to be invoked when a person reasonably believes
that the answer to a question will tend to incriminate them.22 In this
scenario, the person may either speak to the police and risk having her prior
silence or her subsequent speech used against her, or remain silent and risk
having her silence used against her as evidence of guilt. Therefore, a blanket
rule that states that all pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence may be used to
impeach, or as substantive evidence of guilt, is not beneficial to Fifth
Amendment jurisprudence. Such a broad rule would allow an innocent
person to be convicted of a crime that she did not commit.
In a similar vein, the use of silence alone as substantive evidence of guilt
should violate Federal Rule of Evidence 403 because the evidence is unfairly
prejudicial. 2 9 This evidence would have a low probative value because the
evidence does not by itself show that the defendant was engaging in the
behavior because he was guilty. There are other reasons that defendants
engage in silence, and if silence during the questioning is not coupled with
other behaviors that can show that the silence was a result of a guilty mind,
then the silence loses its probative value as evidence. The use of the silence
can also be highly prejudicial as jurors may be likely to believe a prosecutor
when he says that the silence is evidence of guilt.23 If a prosecutor leads the
jury to believe that a person is only silent in the face of police questioning if
she has done something wrong, then the evidence will be presented in a way
that makes it look more probative than it really is,23' and therefore will be
unfairly prejudicial. Jurors, who may have been silent themselves if they had
228.. Id.
229. FED. R. EVID. 403.

230. See Steve M. Wood et al., The Influence of Jurors'Perceptions of Attorneys and their
Performance on Verdict, 23(1) JURY EXPERT 23 (2011) (stating that there was a correlation
between the jurors' positive perceptions of the way that advocates present evidence and a
verdict in favor of that attorney's client, and that this correlation was stronger for the
prosecution or plaintiffs attorneys than it was for defense attorneys; although this
information does not conclusively state that the prosecution is favored, it can lead to the
inference that jurors will believe well-prepared prosecutors).
231. That is, that guilt is the only reason for silence during police questioning.
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been questioned by the police, may believe a prosecutor who says that
silence is always evidence of a guilty mind.
There are several reasons why silence, by itself, is not sufficiently
probative but is highly prejudicial evidence that should be barred not only
by the Fifth Amendment, but also by Federal Rule of Evidence 403.232 First,
an individual who is silent from the beginning of the interview may be
silent for reasons other than because she has something to hide. Rather, she
may remain silent because she is shy or otherwise afraid to talk to the
police.233 A person may also remain silent from the beginning because she
does not understand the language or customs that are used by American
police. Also, a person may be afraid to talk to the police because of her
culture. Second, a person's silence on a specific question may not
necessarily show guilt in all circumstances.
A person who is shy may tend to lock up when put under pressure and,
instead of refuting obviously false allegations, will remain silent. 3 1 In her
case, her silence is not conveying guilt but rather her fear of being
questioned about a crime she knows she did not commit. This problem is
lessened by the fact that a person may invoke her Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by silence in a situation where the
person is in custody.2 35 If, however, the police mislead a person as to the
nature of the questioning, or if the person feels compelled to go to the police
station to give a statement when she is asked, then the person may remain
silent during questioning, and the silence should not be used against her at
trial because it is not a good indication of guilt.
A person may also be afraid to speak to the police because she has
knowledge of the plethora of cases in which an innocent person is convicted
of a crime that the person did not commit because the police coerced a false
confession out of the person.236 That person may refuse to talkto the police
because she is afraid that the police will turn her words against her and use
her words to get the courts to convict her of a crime she did not commit.
232. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
233. See, e.g., United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171,177 (1975).
234. Id.

235. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966) (stating that a person must be
informed that he has the right to remain silent).
236. See ELLIOT ARONSON, TIMOTHY D. WILSON, & ROBIN M. AKERT, SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY
532-35 (6th ed. 2007) (noting that people can be tricked or coerced into making false
confessions, especially if they are led to believe that there is a witness against them, and
mentioning a case in which several boys were imprisoned for 13 years (from 1989-2002) after
wrongfilly confessing to a rape).
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Although the police may not do this often, in the mind of an innocent
person who is being questioned by police, the police can and will twist the
person's words and use them against her.237 Therefore, the person may be
afraid to talk to the police for reasons other than a guilty conscience.
A person may also be silent during police questioning because she does
not understand the language or customs used by American police. A
foreigner who does not understand English very well may not be able to
conduct herself in a manner that other suspects would. She may decide to
come into the police station voluntarily because she believes that it is
required or because she believes that she will get into some sort of trouble if
she does not go to the police station to answer questions. When she gets
there, if she does not understand the language used by the police who are
questioning her, she will not understand the questions. She may either try
to talk to the police in her own language, or she may decide not to speak at
all. In this case, silence will not be probative of guilt; instead, the silence is
simply an indication of the fact that a person is not able to respond to
police. The Fifth Amendment uses the word "person" and not "citizen," and
therefore applies to all people, regardless of citizenship.238 So a foreigner
who is questioned by police may still use the privilege. However, because of
the language and cultural barrier, they may not be able to expressly invoke
the privilege and therefore, should not be required to do so. Instead, these
people should be able to invoke the privilege through silence.
In a similar vein, a person may be silent because her culture has made her
afraid of the police.239 There are several countries and cultures in which
237. See Chapman supra note 222.
238. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

239. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Haiti, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78895.htm (noting that many detainees are
held in preventative detention without a hearing and in violation of certain constitutional
provisions); Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2009 Human Rights Report:

Uzbekistan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136096.htm
(stating that police often beat and otherwise mistreat detainees to obtain incriminating
information, such as confessions, and that torture and abuse are common in prison); Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Sudan, U.S. DEP'T OF
STATE, http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119026.htm (stating that the Sudanese
governmental security forces tortured, beat, and harassed people, especially political

opponents, and that indefinite detentions are common, especially for people who are accused
of violating national security); David Bayley & Robert Perito, Police Corruption, U.S.
PEACE: SPECIAL REP.,

INST.

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR%20294.pdf (stating that an

organization had "reported that in twenty-three countries studied, people saw the police not
,as a source of help and security, but rather of harm, risk, and impoverishment.'").
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police are not an instrument of good and are not trying to protect the
people by ensuring that true criminals are locked up in jail or prison.
Rather, the police are instruments of evil who harm innocent people. 4 ° If a
person from this type of country or culture is questioned by police, then this
person may believe that the police will put her in jail no matter what she
does or says, and may remain silent simply because she does not want to
make her punishment worse. Evidence of the silence engaged in during
questioning should not be used against this type of person since the
evidence is only probative of the culture that the person comes from and is
not probative of guilt. Nevertheless, if the prosecutor portrays the situation
as one in which a reasonable person would rebut any charges, then the
jurors, who may not come from this type of culture, may tend to believe the
prosecutor's portrayal of this evidence. Therefore, the Fifth Amendment
and Federal Rule of Evidence 403 should bar the evidence because of the
unfairly prejudicial effect of the evidence, coupled with its low probative
value.24'
The previously suggested rules are intended to apply in a context in
which a person is silent from the beginning of the interview with police.
There may, however, be situations in which a person is silent on a specific
question, where silence will not be probative of guilt.
Although silence during a specific question is a factor that may
contribute to, an inference of guilt, it should not be the only factor because
there are other reasons that the person may remain silent after being asked
a specific question. For example, if the person being questioned was misled
as to the nature of the questioning, or if the person was being questioned
about another subject, and the nature of the questioning has shifted, the
person may be confused or shocked about the new line of questioning. The
person may therefore be unable to answer the questions. Also, if the person
does not understand the specific question, then the person may not be able
to answer. Additionally, if a person who does not realize that she is

240. See, e.g., Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Haiti, U.S. DEP'T OF
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78895.htm; Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, 2009 Human Rights Report: Uzbekistan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/sca/136096/htm; Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights, and Labor, 2008 Human Rights Report: Sudan, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
http://www.state.gov/j/drl/rls/hrrpt/2008/af/119026.htm; David Bayley & Robert Perito,
REP.,
SPECIAL
PEACE:
U.S.
INST.
Police
Corruption,
STATE,

http://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR%20294.pdf.
241. See FED. R. EVID. 403.
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considered to be a suspect is given questions that suggest that she is, she
may be startled and therefore temporarily unable to answer.
Also, if the line of questioning has changed dramatically, and the person
willingly came to the police station because she believed that she was only
going to be questioned about a certain subject matter, then the person may
not wish to answer questions in this new line of questioning. When the
scope of the questioning shifts dramatically, then the person may not be
voluntarily subject to the questioning, and the nature of the questioning
could be coercive. If the person does not want to answer this new line of
questioning for any reason, the silence could apparently still be used against
her as substantive evidence at her trial.242 Since the interrogation has
arguably become coercive at this point, the Fifth Amendment privilege
against self-incrimination should apply and should prevent the silence from
being admitted as substantive evidence at trial.243 Here, the coercion lies in
the misleading nature of the questioning and in the fact that the police
expect the person to answer the questions.
Also, an individual, especially a foreigner, may not answer a specific
question because she has trouble understanding that particular question. If
a foreigner receives a question that she does not understand because words
or idioms that she is not familiar with are used, then the person's silence
should not be used against her because the silence is not probative of guilt
or innocence, but rather, is simply a fact that shows that the person does not
understand the language and customs of the United States. If this silence is
used as substantive evidence against the person who did not understand the
question, then the evidence will be overly prejudicial. It is prejudicial
because, although the silence may seem probative of guilt, in this situation it
is actually probative of another factor, but is not probative of guilt.
Therefore, a person's silence on a specific question should not be used
against her if her culture or customs would prevent her from understanding
a specific question, or if the setting has prevented the person from being
able to adequately hear the specific question.
The above situations are to be distinguished from a situation in which a
person fails to answer questions posed by the police simply because she
does not want to give an answer she knows will incriminate her. This is why
other factors, along with the silence, should be used to incriminate the

242. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (2013) (holding that a person's pre-arrest,
pre-Mirandasilence could be used against that person as substantive evidence at trial).
243. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that a person cannot be coerced to be a witness
against himself).

2014]

SALINAS V. TEXAS

person. If the person engages in other incriminatory behaviors besides the
silence, then the police and the prosecutor will be able to infer
incrimination from silence. Silence alone, however, without any
corroborating behaviors, will be less probative of guilt, and therefore should
not be used by the police or prosecution as substantive evidence of guilt.
Also, the rule that silence may be used against a defendant as substantive
evidence at trial should be considered dictum since the usage of this rule
was not necessary to bring about the outcome of the case. Salinas v. Texas
could have been decided based on the physical behaviors of the defendant,
along with the silence, and in fact, these factors likely influenced the
outcome of the case.244 Nevertheless, the rationale seems more geared
toward the silence alone.245 In light of the fact that the case was decided
based on the defendant's engagement in several incriminatory behaviors,
such as shuffling his feet, looking down at his feet, and refusing to answer
only one question while freely answering all other questions posed to
him,246 the rule should be based on the totality of the circumstances. In this
vein, the rule that a defendant's silence may be used against him as
substantive evidence does not logically flow from this case. Therefore, the
statements that silence may be used as substantive evidence against a
defendant should be considered dicta and should not be binding on future
cases.
V. CONCLUSION

The fact that Salinas did not call for a decision based solely on the
defendant's silence tends to show that the "rule" that silence may be used as
substantive evidence against a defendant is not a rule at all, but is only dicta.
Therefore, this rule should not be held as binding on future cases. Also,
there are situations in which the use of silence against a defendant can be
highly prejudicial and may lead to an innocent person being convicted of a
crime. Although these situations do not necessarily occur every day, they.
are negative implications of the blanket rule that a defendant's silence
during police questioning may be used against him. These scenarios must
be taken into consideration when making a blanket rule that silence may be
used against a defendant because the only thing worse than allowing a
criminal to go free would be allowing the conviction of an innocent person.

244. See Salinas, 133 U.S. at 2178.
245. See id. at 2177-84.
246. See id. at 2178, 2183.
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Therefore, the blanket rule that silence may be used against a person should
not stand and a totality of the circumstances test should be used in its place.
Finally, the rule that silence may be used as substantive evidence against a
person should be considered dicta since this ruling was not necessary to
decide the case.

